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Abstract Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and
general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tenden-
cies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of
causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an
unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
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Introduction
Consider the two following claims:
(S) David’s smoking caused him to develop lung cancer.
(G) Smoking causes lung cancer.
Traditionally (S) is understood as a singular causal claim, whereas (G) is interpreted
as a general causal claim. The feature ostensibly discriminating between the two
types of statements is the absence or presence of a reference to an entity located in
time and space: (S) refers to David’s smoking, whereas claim (G) lacks a comparable
reference.
The singular–general distinction seems to have a firm place in our everyday use of
causal language as well as in science and philosophy. Philosophers dealing with the
topic of causation usually specify which of the presumably two types of causation
they are talking about. In science it is well known that the methodological
requirements differ as regards the justification of claims like (G) and (S). Last but
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not least, our everyday causal talk includes claims of type (S) as well as claims of
type (G) and we seem to do quite well in (intuitively) differentiating between them.
All this does not necessarily mean, however, that the singular–general distinction
is conceptually basic and important. After all, there is considerable disagreement
among scholars of causation, for example, as to whether there are one, two, or even
more types of causal relations corresponding to the two types of causal claims.1
Christopher Hitchcock, after having defended a one-type approach in Hitchcock
(1995), meanwhile proposes a whole variety of causal relations.2 Two of those var-
ious types of causal relations have been introduced in his Causal Generalizations and
Good Advice, where he diagnoses a severe conceptual confusion concerning the
singular–general distinction:3
I now believe that the distinction between singular and general causation
conflates two separate distinctions, and that this conflation has greatly impeded
progress in the understanding of causal generalizations.
In the present paper I will first address the two distinctions mentioned by
Hitchcock—‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causa-
tion’—and show how he thinks the singular–general distinction conflates them.4
Then, I will give a short summary of an up-to-date regularity theory of causation on
the basis of which I will argue that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is
an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
Hitchcock’s distinctions
Actual causation vs. causal tendencies
According to Hitchcock, ‘to cause’ is a success verb when used in claims about actual
causation. What does it mean for a verb to function as a success verb? Consider the
verbs ‘to know’ and ‘to believe’. The former is a success verb, whereas the latter is
not, because ‘Jago knows that P’ entails the truth of P, whereas ‘Jago believes that P’
does not. In claim (S), mentioned at the beginning of this paper, ‘caused’ is a success
verb. That is, (S) entails that David indeed smoked (or still does) and that he actually
developed lung cancer. Hence, (S) is a statement about actual causation.
Hitchcock’s first example of a claim about a causal tendency is:5
(T) David is the sort of person for whom smoking tends to cause lung cancer.
In contrast to statements about actual causation claims about causal tendencies do
not imply anything about the actual occurrence of the named events: (T) may still be
true even if David never did nor will smoke and never did nor will develop lung
cancer. The verb ‘to cause’ does not function as a success verb in causal tendency
claims.
1 See, for example, Sober (1985) and Eells (1991) for arguments in favor of two types of causal
relations and Carroll (1991) for a one-type approach.
2 See especially Hitchcock (2003).
3 Hitchcock (2001a), p. 219.
4 The actual–tendency distinction is originally due to Good (1961) and (1962).
5 Hitchcock (2001a), p. 220.
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Wide vs. narrow causation
The claims (S) and (T), although belonging to separate categories with respect to the
actual–tendency distinction, nevertheless share a common feature: They are both
narrow causal claims in that they do not explicitly refer to any individual other than
David. (S) is a statement about narrow actual causation, whereas (T) is a claim about
a narrow causal tendency. Following Hitchcock, narrow causal claims ‘‘describe a
causal relationship that holds within an individual or a homogenous population’’.6
Since, as Hitchcock asserts, the distinctions between actual causation vs. causal
tendencies and narrow vs. wide causation cross-classify, there are still two types of
causal statements which we have not considered yet. These are (i) claims about wide
actual causation and (ii) claims about wide causal tendencies.
Hitchcock’s example of claims of wide actual causation is:7
(W) Every year, there are thousands of new cases of lung cancer that are
caused by smoking.
As is true of claim (S), statement (W) implies that the named events took place:
There are, in fact, thousands of cases of lung cancer which are actually caused by
smoking. Unlike (S), however, (W) does not apply to a single individual or a nar-
rowly circumscribed type of individual only—it is far more general. Hence, for
Hitchcock (W) is a claim about wide actual causation.
The remaining type of causal claims relating to the two distinctions is that of wide
causal tendencies. Hitchcock’s example has been already introduced at the beginning
of this paper:
(G) Smoking causes lung cancer.
As statement (T), claim (G) does not imply any actual occurrences of smoking or
lung cancer, hence it is a claim about causal tendencies. In contrast to (T), however,
there is no reference to a particular individual nor a homogenous class of individuals,
so (G) is a claim about a wide causal tendency.
The conflation
Back in 1995, Hitchcock stipulated the following thesis:8
Singular causal claims imply the occurrence of events of a certain sort, while
general causal claims do not.
Today, however, his two new distinctions together with his notion of the singular–
general distinction overthrow the cited thesis.
According to Hitchcock (personal communication) a causal relation is singular, if
it involves particular individuals at particular places and times. By contrast, a causal
relation is general, if it is independent of particular individuals at particular places
and times. According to this characterization both (S) and (T) seem to be cases of
statements about singular causation: Both (S) and (T) refer to the individual David,
and—since David is a particular—particular (frames of) places and times are
6 Hitchcock (2001a), p. 220.
7 Hitchcock (2001a), p. 220.
8 Hitchcock (1995), p. 283.
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intimately tied to the meaning of every claim involving David. Contrary to the 1995-
thesis, however, only claim (S) implies the occurrence of the named events. Hence,
the singular–general distinction conflates the concepts of actual causation and causal
tendencies.
Much the same seems to be true of the wide–narrow distinction: Intuitions similar
to the ones suggesting that singular causation is always actual, may also suggest that
singular causal statements are narrow in scope, whereas general causal statements are
wide. According to Hitchcock’s understanding of the singular–general distinction,
however, the wide causation claim (W) is singular since it refers to causal relations
holding between actual cases of smoking and lung cancer (even though they are not
explicitly named). Hence, the singular–general distinction conflates the wide–narrow
distinction as well. It does not seem possible to strictly differentiate between the four
types of causal statements on the basis of the singular–general distinction as such.
A regularity theory of causation
The merits and limits of a distinction like the singular–general distinction are
dependent on the clarity of the respective concepts, of course. In this section,
Hitchcock’s characterization of singular and general causation will be refined by
introducing a recent regularity account.9
Preliminaries
The regularity theory MT essentially consists of two parts, which are (i) conceptual
analysis and (ii) analysis of causal inferences.10 The principal aim of the conceptual
analysis is to define the notions of causal relevance and singular causation. The
analysis of causal inferences, in contrast, focuses on the kinds of assumptions one has
to accept when justifying causal claims based on empirical data. In this paper,
however, only a simplified sketch of the conceptual analysis will be provided.11
Causal principles
The definition of causal relevance within the framework of MT satisfies four causal
principles. Those principles are thought to constitute a minimal core of criteria
which any theory of deterministic causation should satisfy.
Principle of causal determinism: The same cause is always accompanied by the
same effect.
If there are irreducibly probabilistic relations the MT-analysis does not apply to
them.
9 Regularity theories of causation face a standard set of objections such as the purported inability to
identify epiphenomena and spurious correlations, and to account for the asymmetry of causal
relations. Solutions to the mentioned objections (including the ‘Manchester factory hooters’ and
more) are proposed in Graßhoff and May (2001).
10 The name of the theory, MT, derives from the first letters of the essential theoretical construct:
Minimal Theory. At first sight, MT bears a close resemblance to Mackie’s (1974) INUS-conditions,
but a second glance will show that some important lessons have been learned.
11 For the analysis of causal inferences as well as the details and formal representation of the
conceptual analysis see Graßhoff and May (2001), Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), and
Baumgartner (2005).
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The essence of the second principle is that effects do not occur spontaneously:
Principle of causality: If no cause is present, no effect occurs.
Note, that this principle does not state that every event has a cause. Rather, it
claims that if an event type is considered to be a type of effect of some type of cause,
then whenever an instance of the type of effect occurs there is an occurrence of at
least one of its causes.
Whenever an effect occurs there is a host of event types instantiated, but not all of
those events are indispensable for the effect to occur—some are mere coincidences.
The third principle addresses our intuition that causal dependencies among events
are more than mere coincidences:
Principle of causal relevance: Every type of cause is indispensable for the
occurrence of an effect in at least one situation.
Inferences to causes of an effect are typically based on incomplete knowledge
about the factors instantiated in a causally analyzed process. If additional features of
the situations are taken into account we expect a cause to maintain its relevance.
This expectation is captured by the fourth principle:
Principle of persistent relevance: An event type maintains its causal relevance
when additional event types are taken into account.
Causal relevance and singular causation
Drawing on the four principles introduced in the previous section we may now define
the concepts ultimately needed in order to analyze the notions of causal relevance
and singular causation.
Minimally sufficient conditions (MsC): According to the Principle of Causal
Determinism, a cause is sufficient for its effect: C ﬁ E.12 A material conditional is
insensitive to considerations of relevance, however: From C ﬁ E one can, for
example, derive C&D ﬁ E, whatever D stands for. This violates the Principle of
Causal Relevance. A minimality constraint imposed on sufficient conditions solves
this problem:
MsC: A conjunctive sufficient condition F of an event type Q is a minimally
sufficient conjunction of Q, if and only if no proper part of F is sufficient for Q.
F and Q are used as variables standing for simple or complex event types.13 ‘Proper
part of F¢ means a conjunction F¢ containing fewer conjuncts than F where every
conjunct in F¢ is a conjunct in F.14 In Fig. 1 CX1 is a conjunctive minimally sufficient
condition of E. C refers to a single event type, whereas X1 consists of a conjunction
of simple event types. ‘CX1’ is to be read as C&X1. If C is interpreted in terms of
‘smoking’ then X1 stands for a conjunction of event types including physiological
properties of the smoker, properties of the tobacco, and so on. The arrows mean ‘is
12 An adequate formal representation of causal claims requires first-order logic. For purposes of
simplicity, however, quantifiers, variables, and non-causal relational properties of event types and
events are omitted. As a consequence, material conditionals and bi-conditionals are to be read such
that the event types in the antecedence are always coincidentally instantiated by events different
from the event instantiating the consequence.
13 Complex event types are conjunctions of simple event types.
14 Note that event types redundant relative to one minimally sufficient condition may nonetheless be
part of other minimally sufficient conditions for the same effect.
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causally relevant for’ (the explication of which follows) and the arch between the
arrows symbolizes the conjunction.
Minimally necessary conditions (MnC): The four principles allow alternative
types of causes for a type of effect. Besides a minimally sufficient condition of lung
cancer SX1, which includes smoking S, there is, for example, also a minimally
sufficient condition AX2 not containing smoking, but inhaling asbestos A and
various further (known or unknown) alternative causes Y. Alternative causes of a
type of effect are represented by a disjunction of (minimally) sufficient conditions:
CX1  AX2  Y ﬁ E.
According to the Principle of Causality, for every occurrence of a type of effect E
there is at least one of its causes present. Hence, the disjunction of all alternative
causes of an effect is a necessary condition of the effect. This relation is not modeled
by a material conditional, of course, but we can represent it with a bi-conditional:
CX1  AX2  Y M E.
If A  B is necessary for C, so is A  B  D, whatever D stands for. Hence,
similarly to sufficient conditions, necessary conditions of an effect have to be sub-
jected to a minimality criterion in order to satisfy the Principle of Causal Relevance:
MnC: A disjunctive necessary condition Y of Q is a minimally necessary con-
dition of Q, if and only if no proper part of Y is necessary for Q.
‘Proper part of Y¢ means a disjunction Y¢ containing fewer disjuncts than Y, where
every disjunct in Y¢ is a disjunct in Y. In Fig. 2 the disjunction CX1  DX2  Y is a
minimally necessary condition of E. CX1 and DX2 are simple minimally sufficient
conditions of E, and Y is a complex minimally sufficient condition of E consisting of
a disjunction of simple minimally sufficient conditions. The absence of an arch be-
tween arrows symbolizes disjunction. A minimally necessary disjunction of mini-
mally sufficient conditions of E is called a minimal theory of E.
Causal relevance: A necessary condition of the causal relevance of an event type C
for an event type E is the membership of C in a minimal theory of E. C’s being part
of a minimal theory of E is not sufficient for the causal relevance of C for E,
however. Minimal theories always are constructed by considering a restricted set of
event types, i.e., the frame of event types of a minimal theory. Given certain causal
structures such as epiphenomena, a later extension of the set of event types origi-
nally considered may affect the composition of an original minimal theory. In case a
certain event type D ceases to be part of a minimal theory of E after the frame of
Fig. 1 The minimally sufficient condition CX1 of E
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event types has been extended, D is not causally relevant to begin with. This
implementation of the Principle of Persistent Relevance enters the definition of
causal relevance:
CR: An event type C is causally relevant for an event type E if and only if (i) C
is part of a minimal theory of E, and (ii) C stays part of this minimal theory
across any extensions of its frame of event types.15
Singular causation: In contrast to general causation, singular causation is a relation
between entities located in time and space:
SC: Two events c and e stand in a singular causal relation if and only if c instan-
tiates a positive event type C which, according to CR, is causally relevant for an
event type E, such that e instantiates E, and c is coincident with other events that
instantiate a minimally sufficient condition CX of E, in which C is contained.
In the framework of MT, prevention and ‘causation’ by omission are not considered
to be cases of genuine singular causation. Rather, claims about prevention and
‘causation’ by omission express explanatory relations which are relations between
facts.16
Hitchcock’s distinctions revisited
Equipped with the basic concepts of MT let us revisit Hitchcock’s distinctions.17
Actual causation vs. causal tendencies
As to the relation between the singular–general distinction and actual causation
vs. causal tendencies Hitchcock’s (2001) conclusion is that singular causation, in
Fig. 2 A minimal theory of E, consisting of the minimally necessary condition CX1  DX2  Y
15 In fact, (CR) is the definition of direct causal relevance. Indirect causal relevance is also defined
within the framework of MT, but the distinction of direct vs. indirect causal relevance is of no
importance for the subject of this paper.
16 For similar views see for example Davidson (1967), p. 702f and Dowe (2001).
17 The following critique of Hitchcock’s distinctions can also be stated on the basis of theories of
causation other than MT.
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contrast to his 1995-thesis, is not always actual causation (see p. 3). The most rele-
vant example is claim (T) which, according to Hitchcock’s characterization, is a
statement about singular causation, because it involves a particular individual (i.e.,
David), but nonetheless does not imply anything with respect to the actual occur-
rence of the named events.
For a claim to be about a singular causal relation in the sense of MT a statement
has to refer to at least two events standing in a causal relation (see SC on p. 7). This
is not the case for (T):
(i) Smoking S is causally relevant for lung cancer L.
(ii) David instantiates a conjunction of event types X together with which smoking
is a minimally sufficient condition SX, which is part of a minimal theory of L.
Part (i) of the Minimal Theorist’s explication of (T) explains why (T) does not imply
anything about David’s actual behavior regarding smoking and the developing of
lung cancer: (i) is only a claim about the general causal relation between smoking
and lung cancer and, according to CR, claims about general causation do not imply
anything about particular instances of event types (see p. 7). The Principle of Causal
Relevance requires that there is at least one situation in which an instance of
smoking is indispensable for lung cancer to occur, but it does not matter which
particular situation this is.18 Part (ii), in turn, accounts for the fact that (T) includes a
reference to a particular individual without stating a singular causal relation: (ii)
claims that David instantiates a certain conjunction of event types X but not that he
instantiates SX and L as SC would require for (T) to express a singular causal
relation (see p. 7).19
One might argue against the MT-analysis of the meaning of (T) by claiming that
the conjunction of (i) and (ii) does not explicate statements like (T) but rather
statements of the following type:
(T¢) David is the sort of person for whom smoking causes lung cancer.
Claim (T¢) differs from (T) only in that the expression ‘tends to cause’ is replaced
with ‘causes’. The two statements should therefore be a paradigmatic case of the
distinction between actual causation and causal tendency. If the difference between
(T) and (T¢) could be explicated with reference to Hitchcock’s actual–tendency
distinction, however, (T¢) should imply the actual occurrence of David’s smoking
and developing of lung cancer. But it does not. Possibly, the occasional occurrence of
the verb ‘to tend’ in causal claims simply stresses the fact that such claims are not
statements about singular causation. Another possibility would be that (T), in con-
trast to (T¢), refers to something like indeterministic causation. This, however, would
not have anything to do with the thesis about the conflation of the actual–tendency
distinction with the singular–general distinction.
18 Even Hitchcock himself assumes that on type-level, i.e., general causation, the verb ‘to cause’
always describes causal tendencies rather than cases of actual causation (see Hitchcock (2001b),
p. 375, footnote 9).
19 The difference between Hitchcock’s classification of (T) as a narrow causal tendency and its MT-
analysis may be considered as merely terminological, concerning what ‘singular causal statement’ is
to mean. The fact that, according to Hitchcock’s account of singular vs. general causation, (T) is a
claim about singular causation even though the only causal relation expressed is one between types
of events, however, seems to be a terminological oddity worth criticizing.
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In contrast to (T), claim (S) is interpreted as a statement about singular causation
within MT:
(i) Smoking S is causally relevant for lung cancer L, and
(ii¢) David instantiates a minimally sufficient condition SXi containing smoking S,
and SXi is part of a minimal theory of L.
20
There are two particular events, David’s smoking and his developing of lung cancer,
respectively, which are claimed to stand in a singular causal relation as explicated by
SC. Events are spatiotemporally located entities.21 Hence, every claim about sin-
gular causation implies the actual occurrence of the named events because of the
very notion of an event.
Though not as typical as claim (S), statement (W) is a claim about singular
causation, too:
(i) Smoking S is causally relevant for lung cancer L, and
(ii¢¢) Every year, thousands of people instantiate a minimally sufficient condition
SXi containing smoking S, and SXi is part of a minimal theory of L.
There are, in fact, thousands of causally related cases (i.e., spatiotemporally located
entities) of smoking and lung cancer every year. Any additional categorization of
(W) in terms of the actual–tendency distinction is superfluous, since all claims about
singular causation are claims about actual causation.
Claim (G), finally, is an example of a statement about general causation as pro-
totypical as claim (S) is an example of a statement about singular causation:
(i) Smoking S is causally relevant for lung cancer L.
(G) states a causal relation between two types of events, i.e., smoking and lung
cancer, respectively. According to the MT-analysis of causal relevance CR, it con-
tains absolutely no explicit or implicit reference to particular instances of the
mentioned types of events, and as such does not imply anything about particular
occurrences of events of the mentioned types. Again, the actual–tendency distinction
does not further illuminate the meaning of the claim, since being a claim about
general causation implies not being a claim about actual causation.22
Let us now turn to the other two types of causation which, according to Hitchcock
(2001), are conflated with the singular–general distinction, too.
Wide vs. narrow causation
Both (S) and (W) fall into the category of claims about singular causal relations. Yet,
according to Hitchcock they differ with respect to the distinction of narrow vs. wide
20 David also instantiates L, of course, but this follows from David’s instantiation of SXi.
21 This seems to be true according to any arbitrary theory of events.
22 I’m fully aware that CR as the analysis of (G) does not explicate the undoubted practical and
conceptual connections between general causal claims like (G) and recommendations for inter-
ventions (i.e., ‘Refrain from smoking if you do not want to develop lung cancer’). The MT-account of
those connections will, of course, refer to CR, but such an analysis of (recommendations for)
interventions is considered to be a task separate from the analysis of claims like (G) in terms of CR.
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causation: (S) states a causal relation that holds within a particular individual, i.e.,
David, whereas (W) describes a causal relation that holds within a broader, more
heterogenous population.
The claim about the general causal relation between smoking and lung cancer (i)
which is part of the meaning of (S) is restricted neither to a particular individual nor
a homogenous population: It only states that there is at least one combination of
causal conditions for lung cancer of which smoking is, according to CR, a non-
redundant part. As can be seen when comparing the respective MT-analyses of (S)
and (W) in the previous section, the same proposition (i) is also part of the meaning
of (W). Since the causal relevance claim concerning smoking and lung cancer (i) is
exactly the same in the analysis of (S) and (W) it should be clear that the scope of the
therein claimed (general) causal relation does not differ between (S) and (W). If we
do state the causal relevance of a certain type of event for another, e.g. smoking is
causally relevant for lung cancer, we neither make an implicit nor an explicit claim
about the frequency with which particular instances of smoking actually cause in-
stances of lung cancer in different populations.23
The difference between claim (S) and (W) arises only in the second parts of the
respective analyses which in conjunction with the respective first parts account for
(S) and (W) being statements about singular causation: In (ii¢) there is only one
single individual, i.e., David, which is claimed to instantiate a minimally sufficient
condition of lung cancer such that his smoking is to be regarded as a cause of his lung
cancer. Claim (ii¢¢), in contrast, refers to thousands of people instantiating some
minimally sufficient condition of lung cancer such that their smoking is to be re-
garded as a cause of their lung cancer. Note, that it is possible that all of the
thousands of people referred to in (W) as well as David instantiate exactly the same
minimally sufficient condition SXi of lung cancer. This would mean that it is exactly
the same causal regularity which is instantiated by David and the thousands of
people, respectively. The essential qua necessary difference between (S) and (W) is
the mere number of instantiations which is one in (S) and thousands in (W). This
difference has nothing to do with the nature of the causal relations expressed in (S)
and (W) as the distinction between wide and narrow causation wrongly suggests. The
causal relations expressed in (S) and (W) are of one and the same kind: singular
causation.
Conclusion
MT, in contrast to Hitchcock’s account, does not postulate more than two (inter-
related) types of causal relations, i.e., causal relevance and singular causation. This is
not to say, however, that there are only two types of causal statements. Yet, whereas
Hitchcock introduces four causal relations in order to cope with four types of causal
claims, MT is able to differentiate between those causal statements on the basis of
the traditional two types of causation alone. For the sake of Ockham’s razor
Hitchcock’s four types of causal relations are to be dismissed in favor of the sin-
gular–general distinction as explicated by MT.
23 It seems to me that the very basic idea of probabilistic analyses of causation, i.e., probability-
raising of effects by their causes, promotes exactly this confusion between the existence of a general
causal relation and the frequency of its instantiation in certain populations.
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